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COMMENTS
SIMULTANEOUS COPYRIGHT AND TRADE
SECRET PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER
PROGRAMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer programs have posed a difficult problem con-
cerning their protection as intellectual property. Patent, copy-
right, and trade secret law have all been explored, but because
of the drawbacks of each method, no single legal basis has
proven totally acceptable.1 This has prompted attorneys to
look towards a combination of several forms to provide more
thorough and comprehensive protection for their clients'
needs.
Many licensing agreements restrict the use and disclosure
of software' with specific emphasis placed on the secret nature
of the computer program.8 The confidential status of the li-
censing agreement is often reinforced with a notice of copy-
right and a warning that any unauthorized use may result in a
suit against the user for infringement. 4 The intent is that this
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1. Patents are frequently too expensive, difficult to acquire, and uncertain in
their application to programs; copyright only protects the expression of the work, not
its underlying idea; trade secrecy will be lost forever once the idea is disclosed. See
generally C. TAPPER, CoMPUrER LAW ch. 1 (1978).
2. The term software is generally equated with computer programs. As defined
in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980), a computer program is "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result."
3. It may be agreed that the subject is a trade secret, or that neither party will
disclose the idea to a third party. In either case, the effect is the same.
4. The license must unequivocally state that it is only a lease and confers no
greater rights than use. To effect this the copyright owner should specify such things
as the term of the lease, allocation of risk of loss, and disposition of the software at
the expiration of the lease. Otherwise, it may be possible to construe the transaction
as a sale, and inquiry may be made into the propriety of the restrictions because a
copyright may not control the work after it has been sold. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349-51 (1908); see also United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630
(S.D. Tex. 1959). If the transaction is interpreted as a sale, the contractually based
restrictions may be seen as impermissibly extending the copyright monopoly. See
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dual protection will act in a complementary fashion by elimi-
nating the disadvantages of each system and by providing
supplemental protection in the event that one form fails.'
Thus, trade secret protection shields the underlying idea, and
the copyright protects its expression.
Simultaneous use of copyright and trade secret also
broadens potential infringement remedies because one form is
retrospective while the other is prospective. Trade secret law
enables the licensor to prevent present or future disclosure of
the idea' (prospective), and copyright provides injunctive re-
lief for unauthorized copying, statutory or actual damages for
each act of infringements and, in limited circumstances, attor-
neys fees9 (retrospective).
This comment will focus on the simultaneous use of trade
secret and copyright protection for computer programs. Sev-
eral obstacles that stand in the way of simultaneous protec-
tion will be discussed. For example, the new Copyright Act e
preempts those rights granted by state law which are
equivalent to the exclusive rights granted by the new legisla-
tion.1" Since trade secret law is a state created law that may
exercise control over the same subject matter as copyright, it
falls within this suspect class. Furthermore, the policy consid-
erations supporting trade secret and copyright protection ap-
pear to conflict; this raises the issue of whether the two doc-
trines are mutually exclusive. Trade secrecy operates to limit
disclosure, while copyright policy generally promotes disclos-
Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29 (1964). To be exempt from the antitrust laws, the au-
thor must retain some property right, such as title, in the work. United States v.
Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See generally Hearn & Berthold, Copyright and Trade
Secret Protection for Computer Programs, 18 IN BRIEF 27 (1981) (publication of the
SANTA CLARA B.J.); Charney, Practical Aspects of Software Licensing, 4 NEw MATTER
1 (1981) (official publication of the California Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Sec-
tion); Selinger, Patent Licensing in the Afterglow of Sylvania: Practicalities Under
the Rule of Reason, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 353 (1981).
5. Trade secret protection may be lost by independent discovery, reverse engi-
neering, or accidental disclosure. D. BROOKS, COMPUTER LAW 129-30 (1980). See
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
6. Johnson, Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1004
(1978).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1976).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
i0. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as "the 1976 Act" or
"the Act"].
11. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
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ure. When both forms of protection are used simultaneously,
the issue arises as to whether the affixation of copyright,
which implies a publication, would preclude a claim of se-
crecy. In spite of these obstacles, this comment will argue that
simultaneous trade secret and copyright protection finds sup-
port both in case law and in public policy."2
II. HiSTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Trade Secret and Copyright
Trade secrecy is a branch of unfair competition and
originated as a part of state common law. A trade secret is
"any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him the op-
portunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it."" The only requirements are actual secrecy
and some degree of novelty." A trade secret is given effect
when it is agreed to by contract, enforced by a confidential
relationship, or when the knowledge is gained by improper
means. 6 Even though it has the potential for perpetual exis-
tence, it may be totally and forever lost once the secret has
been inadvertently disclosed.1 7
A copyright is an incorporeal right recognized in the
United States Constitution" and granted by federal statute.19
Copyright protection extends only to the surface expression of
the work and leaves the idea open for copying.20 Although this
12. For discussions to the contrary, see Luccavelli, The Supremacy of Federal
Copyright Law Over State Trade Secret Law For Copyrightable Computer Programs
Marked With a Copyright Notice, 3 Coup. L. J. 19 (1981); Note, Protecting Trade
Secrets Through Copyright, 1981 DuK L.J. 981 (1981).
13. Nimitz, Development of the Law of Computer Software Protection, 61; J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 3, 19 (1979).
14. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). The Second Restatement
does not address trade secrets because most jurisdictions have resolved the problem
statutorily.
15. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974).
16. See D. BROOKS, supra note 5, at 130-31, Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475-76.
17. See C. TAPPER, supra note 1, ch. 1. However, if a limited disclosure occurs
by a breach of confidence, a court may "call it back in" with injunctive relief. For a
discussion of trade secret disclosure, see Zupanec, Disclosure of Trade Secret as
Abandonment of Secrecy, 92 A.L.R. 3d 138 (1979).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1976).
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limitation may not be particularly significant with literary or
artistic works, it poses a very real danger in computer pro-
gram protection because the underlying idea is the thing of
value.
B. Copyrightability of Computer Programs
The test for copyrightability is found in section 10221 of
the 1976 Act which sets forth two indicia necessary for copy-
right protection. First, the work has to be fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, 2 and second, it must be proper subject
matter as evidenced by those things specifically mentioned in
the statute.28 While historically there was a controversy over
whether software was eligible for copyright, the issue has been
resolved in favor of extending protection to these works.2
1. Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression
Although computer programs may be thought of as eva-
nescent, they are fixed because they exist in memories, mag-
netic tapes, discs, and silicon chips.2 5 Computer printouts,
flowcharts, or silicon chips are considered to be fixed expres-
sions as the legislative history of section 102 explains:
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, man-
ner, or medium of fixation may be-whether it is in
words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other
graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physi-
cal object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural,
punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and whether
it is capable of perception directly or by means of any
machine or device "now known or later developed."2
While it is evident that software meets the first criterion
of section 102, until recently it remained largely unresolved as
to whether programs were included in the general categories
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
22. "A work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
23. See infra note 30.
24. See infra notes 25-56 and accompanying text.
25. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
26. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5665 [hereinafter cited as 1976 House REPORT].
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of things listed in section 102 as proper subject matter.2
2. Proper Subject Matter
Even though the Copyright Office had been accepting
computer programs since 1964,28 the language of the 1976 Act
was unclear as to whether software was proper subject mat-
ter.2 9 Section 102 protects all original works fixed in a tangible
medium that can be read either directly or with a machine or
device, but the short list of examples included in the section
does not mention computer programs.30 However, the original
section 117 31of the proposed 1976 Act did provide that no
greater or lesser rights were to be given computer programs.
In this section Congress intended to preserve decisional law
that had arisen under the 1909 Act because it was considered
premature to change the policy on computer works 2 without
a more thorough study of the area.3 The lack of specific lan-
guage in the 1976 Copyright Act left the question of protect-
ing computer programs largely unresolved.3 "
In 1974 Congress appointed a committee to study the ef-
fects of copyright on new areas of technology,3 5 including com-
27. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
28. Boorstyn & Fliesler, Copyright, Computers, and Confusions, 56 CAL. ST.
B.J. 148 (1981) reprinted in 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 276 (1981).
29. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812,
817-25 (E. Pa. 1982).
30. Subject matter of copyright: In general
(a)Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. 102(a) (1976).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976) (prior to 1980 amendment).
32. Boorstyn, supra note 28, at 284-85.
33. Hearn & Berthold, supra note 4.
34. Id.
35. This committee was appointed pursuant to Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat.
1873 (1974). See Galbi, Copyright Law ... Unfair Competition as Applied to the
Protection of Computer Programming, 3 COMPUTER L. SERv. REP., 4-3, at 1, 12
(1979).
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puter programs. The National Committee on New Technologi-
cal Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) undertook the
study and three years later recommended changes in the 1976
Act to aid protection of authors' rights in their software.3 6
Public Law 96-51711 added the definition of computer pro-
grams to the general definitional section3 8 and section 117 was
amended to clarify that computer programs were proper sub-
ject matter under the 1976 Act."'
Even though software is now proper subject matter for
copyright, this protection does not necessarily extend to the
physical or mechanical embodiments of copyrighted works.
This limitation presents a very real danger to program au-
thors because computer technology has reached the point
where programs can be directly imprinted onto silicon chips.4
Potentially, this would enable an infringer to circumvent the
law by reducing the program to a physical chip or simply cop-
ying one that is already in existence.
The distinction between physical and non-physical em-
bodiments originated in the 1908 case of White-Smith Pub-
lishing Co. v. Apollo41 where the United States Supreme
Court held that a mechanical form of a copyrighted song (a
36. Software Subcommittee Report and Additional Views, National Committee
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, PAT. TRADEMARK J. (BNA) 334
(1977); see also Galbi, supra note 35.
37. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028-29 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101,
117) [hereinafter referred to as the 1980 Amendment].
38. See supra note 2.
39. Limitations on exclusive rights:
Computer programs notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is
not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provided:
(1)that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine
and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2)that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued posses-
sion of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy
from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or
other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may
be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
40. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D.
Cal. (1981)).
41. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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player piano roll) did not infringe the copyright.42 It had to be
a visually perceptible copy to constitute true infringement.4
The first case to extend this rule to the computer context
was Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group Inc.." Here
the physical embodiment of a computer program was in the
form of a silicon chip. Plaintiff had permanently encoded a
chess playing program onto a Read Only Memory (ROM)
silicon chip" and defendant copied and sold it as his own
product.
Even though the 1976 Act had abrogated the artificial
distinctions made by White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo,46
the court applied the pre-1976 law as required by former sec-
tion 117.4" The Data Cash court declared that the ROM chip
was not a copy of the "program," and even if it was a copy, it
was not actionable. 8 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the
decision was affirmed on procedural grounds, namely, failure
to use the copyright notice as required, so that the merits of
the district court decision were not reached.4e
However, the 1980 amendment to the 1976 Act changes
the decisional law under White-Smith and Data-Cash by ad-
ding the definition of computer programs to section 10150 and
by replacing the previous section 117 with a new provision di-
rectly applicable to computer programs." In addition to the
1980 amendment, another factor weighing against the Data-
Cash case is a recent decision of the United States District
Court in the Northern District of California. In Tandy Corp.
v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc.,5 1 the court held that com-
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 17.
44. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979); affd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038
(7th Cir. 1980).
45. Read Only Memory (or storage) is defined as "[a] storage device that stores
data not alterable by computer instructions.... non-erasable storage." C. SIPPL, COM-
PUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK 260 (1967). See also, Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (2d Cir. 1983).
46. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5664, 5665.
47. Boorstyn, supra note 28, at 284.
48. 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
49. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit refused to consider the
grounds used by the District Court because "the parties had neither briefed nor ar-
gued that issue and neither side on appeal defends the District Court's position, so we
do not consider it further." Id. at 1041.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
52. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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puter programs were copyrightable whether they existed on
paper or were imprinted onto silicon chips." The existence of
the computer program on the chip fulfilled the requirement of
fixation in a tangible means of expression because it could be
read "either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
54
The court rejected the White-Smith/Data Cash rationale be-
cause "the unauthorized duplication of a silicon chip would
render the theoretical ability to copyright computer programs
meaningless."55 The Tandy court looked to the substance of
the informational carrying capacity of ROM and concluded
that it was merely a physical form of the copyrighted pro-
gram, its value being in the intellectual information
conveyed.5
The Tandy case stands for the proposition that not only
are computer programs proper subject matter for copyright,
but the mechanical embodiment is also subject to copyright
regulation.5 7 Any contrary holding would have provided in-
fringers with an easy mechanism to circumvent the copyright
protection embodied in the program.
III. COMPETITION BETWEEN SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE WITH
SIMULTANEOUS USE OF TRADE SECRECY AND COPYRIGHT
A. Mutual Exclusivity?
The simultaneous use of trade secret and copyright pro-
tection raises issues of mutual exclusivity. Once a copyright
notice is affixed to a program, courts could treat it as evidence
of public disclosure and loss of the trade secret. This thresh-
old issue, whether trade secret and copyright protection are
technically incompatible, has been litigated before and re-
solved in favor of simultaneous use." In these cases, the
courts are asked to decide when affixation of a copyright no-
tice constitutes disclosure of the trade secret.
As early as 1907 the United States Supreme Court held
53. Id. at 173; 8ee also Williams Electronics v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d
Cir. 1982).
54. 524 F. Supp. at 173.
55. 524 F. Supp. at 175.
56. Id.
57. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 714 F.2d 1240 (2d
Cir. 1983); Williams Electronics Inc. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
58. See infra notes 59-143 and accompanying text.
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that even though a general publication extinguished a claim of
secrecy, a limited publication was entirely permissible.5 9 In
Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc. 0 se-
crecy was retained even though common law copyrighted
works were distributed to multiple licensees. The court held
that the existence of a confidential agreement was sufficient to
restrain disclosure of unpublished computer logic diagrams. 1
This analysis found its way into the lower federal courts
in Management Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Systems,
Inc.62 and Technicon Medical Information Systems v. Green
Bay Packaging, Inc.65 Here again, the defendants claimed
that the act of affixing a copyright notice estopped plaintiffs
from claiming secrecy. In both cases the courts relied on the
Data General rationale and held that the mere act of affixing
a copyright notice to the software did not void a claim of se-
crecy because notice was a separate issue from publication. 4
The 1976 Act changed this situation in one important re-
spect: Common law copyright is eliminated 5 making it im-
possible to completely withhold registration and sue for in-
fringement. Even though copyright protection exists upon
creation, 6 all works must be registered and deposited with the
Copyright Office prior to suit. 7 This deposit could potentially
make the work available to the public and nullify all claims of
secrecy. If the work is deposited with the Copyright Office, a
59. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); accord White
v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 957 (1952); see
also Comment, Implications of Limited Publication Under Common Law Copyright,
14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 246 (1980). See generally Berry v. Glidden, 92 F. Supp. 909
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); Lemelson v. Kellogg, 440 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1971); see also 92 A.L.R.
3d 138, 167-71 (1979).
60. 357 A.2d 105 (Del. 1975).
61. Disclosure problems may arise with mass marketed programs because of
their fungibility and easy access. Specially contracted software is usually tailored to
one user, and therefore, the market is narrow. As a result, it is easier to control the
dissemination and secrecy of the program.
62. 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (CALLAGHAN) 921 (1978).
63. 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 343 (1980), aff'd, 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982); See
also Bryce v. Gladstone, 107 Wis.2d 241, 319 N.W.2d 907 (1981), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3304(192).
64. 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (CALLAGHAN) 921, 924 (1978); See 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 343, 347 (1980); see also H.R. REP. No. 6983, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. (1982).
65. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5659, 5745.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 (1976). For works such as secure tests, see 37 C.F.R. §
202.20(b)(4), only identifying portions need to be retained by the copyright office, 37
C.F.R. § 202.20 (c)(2)(vi) (1982).
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presumption may arise that the work is in the public do-
main." This position would be further strengthened after the
first suit for infringement because the court would make the
software location in the office known to the public, and there-
fore, freely available. Many authors have tried to circumvent
this by waiting for an infringement to occur before register-
ing. 9 While this will keep the program secret until the time of
suit, it does not guarantee that secrecy will remain after the
suit.
B. Alternate Means for Registration and Deposit
Section 408(c)(1) 70 of the Act allows for optional deposit
of identifying portions of the copyrighted work, and the Code
of Federal Regulations provides that only the first and last
twenty-five pages of the machine readable object code7 1 need
be used for deposit.72 This allows the work to be identified
while maintaining the program's overall secrecy provided no
valuable information is given away on those pages.
Permissive deposit of computer programs renders the
withholding method unnecessary. Under this procedure it
68. 17 U.S.C. § 705 (1976). This section provides for public inspection of copy-
righted works.
69. The owner may also elect to sue for misappropriation of trade secrets,
rather than copyright infringement. In this instance he would not have to register the
program because his cause of action does not involve copyright.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1976).
71. Machine readable object code may be defined as: "the software code in bi-
nary form which provides the instructions that are executed by the computer." C.
SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK 180 (1966). Source code is the program's
human readable form Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1243 (2nd Cir. 1983), and may be used for deposit along with the object code.
Currently, the Copyright Office is reviewing the deposit regulations for computer pro-
grams, 48 Fed. Reg. 22951 (1983), and has instituted some informal deposit proce-
dures in the interim. Three alternative deposits are offered if an applicant requests
special relief:
1. The Office will accept the first and last twenty-five pages of Ob-
ject code and any ten consecutive pages of source code. There must be
nothing obliterated in the source code.
2. The Office will accept the first ten and the last ten pages of the
source code, with nothing obliterated.
3. The Office will accept the first and last twenty-five pages of the
source code with up to fifty per cent of the source code obliterated.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS (1983).
72. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c) vii (1981). See generally H.R. REP. No. 6983, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). For a general discussion of optional deposit of literary and
computer works, see 48 Fed. Reg. 2295 (1983).
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would be possible for the computer program to be registered
while maintaining secrecy. As a result, there would be no limi-
tation on available remedies because they are tied to the date
of registration.73 If registration is effected prior to infringe-
ment, the author is entitled to the alternative relief of statu-
tory damages and, in egregious cases, attorneys fees. 4 Due to
the existence of permissive registration and additional reme-
dies, it may prove more desirable to register early rather than
just prior to suit.7 '
Although the 1976 Act changes the deposit require-
ments,7 6 courts have continued to apply the Data General ra-
tionale. For example, in Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-
Time Engineering Systems, Inc.,7 the Data General scenario
was again presented to the court wherein the court stated that
the "mere fact that an expression is copyrighted does not, in
and of itself, disclose the trade secret or eliminate its mantle
of confidentiality. '7 8 This case bears out the proposition that
disclosure of the work is not nesessary to obtain copyright
protection and that each form may exist together without ex-
clusion. 9 In order to destroy secrecy, disclosure must be
proven as a matter of fact, not as a matter of law. 0
IV. PREEMPTION
The second major obstacle to simultaneous use of trade
secret and copyright is preemption. Preemption occurs when a
state law obstructs the accomplishment or execution of the
73. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (1976).
74. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
§11:9 (1977).
75. A program author would wish to have enforceable copyright protection at
the earliest possible moment because the damage occurs at the time of the infringe-
ment. If the author does not register until the suit is filed he loses the ability to
collect certain damages, and he continues to run the risk of public disclosure if the
entire program is registered. Additionally, a certificate of registration made withinfive years of the initial publication is prima facie evidence of a valid copyright. 17
U.S.C. §410(c) (1976).
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 (1976).
77. 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Wis. 1981).
78. Id. at 368.
79. See generally H.R. REP. No. 6983, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982); see also the
disclosure requirements to secure tests. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (c)(2)(vi) (1982).
80. But see Note, Protecting Trade Secrets Through Copyright, 1981 DUKE L.J.981, 996 (1981); Luccavelli, The Supremacy of Federal Copyright Law Over State
Trade Secret Law for Copyrightable Computer Programs Marked With a Copyright
Notice, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 19, 50-51(1981).
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objectives of an act of Congress."' The supremacy of federal
law over conflicting state law is provided for in the United
States Constitution;8 therefore, copyright, being federal law,
will preempt state laws that unduly conflict with the purpose
and scope of the federal statute.8 The scope of states' rights
in those areas unaddressed by Congress, and the extent to
which the federal law preempts state law, has largely been es-
tablished by judicial decision.
A. Early Case Analysis
The intellectual property cases dealing with the scope of
preemption arose from two decisions handed down by the
United States Supreme Court on the same day. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.8 4 and Compco, Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.85 both involved state law claims of unfair com-
petition for the unauthorized copying of unpatented articles
by the defendants, Sears and Compco. The lower courts held
the design patents invalid but granted an injunction against
further copying on the unfair competition claims.8" The Su-
preme Court reversed the injunctions holding that a restraint
on copying of an article that was denied patent protection
conflicted with the federal patent policy,87 because if such a
restraint were permitted the state could withhold something
from the public which federal law intended to make freely
available. 88 Enforcement of the state laws involved would have
given patent protection, for a potentially unlimited time, to
articles that did not even merit the limited grant of protection
under the federal statute. This broad reading of the preemp-
tion doctrine left state law, particularly trade secret law, in an
unsettled condition until the Court spoke on the matter ten
81. For example, when the state attempts to regulate the same matter as a fed-
eral statute, the federal legislation controls. See, e.g., Florida Lime and Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 929 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940);
Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: The Case of Droit de
Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 200 (1978).
82. U.S. Const. art. VI.
83. Id.
84. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
85. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
86. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963); Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1963).
87. 376 U.S. 225 (1964); 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
88. 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
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years later.
The first case to limit the Sears/Compco preemption doc-
trine was Goldstein v. California." Goldstein was convicted
under a state statute designed to punish tape piracy. 90 He
challenged the law as being preempted because it operated in
an area governed by federal copyright law."' The Supreme
Court found the California law to be constitutional, reasoning
that Congress had simply left the area of tape piracy unat-
tended, and therefore, there was no intent to foreclose state
regulation. 9 This holding appeared to open up the state
power to regulate in federal areas where there was no specific
conflict.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp." was decided one year
later and involved the tortious misappropriation of trade
secrets by plaintiff's former employees. The Court realized
that state trade secret law provided protection in an area also
touched by federal patent law, but held the state law to be a
valid exercise of power and therefore not preempted. The
Court distinguished Sears and Compco by stating that trade
secrets do not clash with patents because they protect differ-
ent interests.'4 Trade secrets, as an alternate form of protec-
tion, were beneficial to society because they "[promote] the
sharing of knowledge and the efficient operation of industry;
[in addition, they permit] the individual inventor to reap the
rewards of his labor . . . ."9 As a result, trade secrets do not
frustrate the purposes behind the patent statute, they simply
foster new development and competition in an alternate way.
The Court also focused on the absence of any Congressional
discussion on the matter."e From this, the Court concluded
that Congressional inaction in the area of trade secrets, com-
bined with long-standing, established state law on the subject
implied that Congress had considered the matter but chose
89. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
90. Tape piracy is the copying and/or selling of musical recordings without per-
mission of the copyright owner. Id. at 548.
91. The 1909 Act did not specifically address musical recordings as proper sub-ject matter for copyright; therefore, it was thought that these recordings could not be
afforded protection under any state law designed to prohibit copying. Id. at 563-65.
92. 412 U.S. 546, 567-68 (1973).
93. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
94. Id. at 492.
95. Id. at 494.
96. Id. at 482-93.
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not to act.97
Goldstein and Kewanee reflected a change in the focus of
preemption analysis by the Court. Its position had shifted
from the premise that all intellectual property, even that
which was not entitled to federal protection, was reserved for
federal government regulation, to an inquiry into Congres-
sional intent to occupy the field. If the intent to occupy the
field was absent, a determination was made to see if the chal-
lenged state right conflicted with the goals of the federal stat-
ute. Only if the conflict presented too great an interference
with the purposes of the federal law, was the state statute
preempted.
B. Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act
The 1976 Act introduced a specific section relating to pre-
emption.9 8 It has been characterized as the most noticeable
change in copyright regulation since 1909.9" Section 301(a)
provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106
in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether
created before or after that date and whether published
or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law
or statutes of any State. 00
To determine what legal or equitable rights are
equivalent to those granted in section 106101 the drafters of
97. Id.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976).
99. HousE REPoRT, supra note 26, at 5745.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976).
101. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
[Vol. 231050
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the statute attempted to provide some illustrative examples of
state rights that were not preempted.
In its original version, section 301 listed examples of
nonequivalent rights, in which trade secrecy was included."0 2
However, these examples were omitted from the final codifica-
tion of section 301 because it was thought that the examples
might be "interpreted so broadly as to render the preemption
section meaningless. 103 At least one commentator has stated
that this deletion cast a cloud on non-equivalent state rights
and turned the determination into a treacherous task.10 4
Since no legislative guidelines are available as examples
of equivalent rights, 05 the two-tiered analysis'0 6 set forth in
the statute and the case law analysis that has developed must
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, includ-
ing the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. IV 1980).
102. Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the com-
mon law or statutes of any State with respect to:
(3) Activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by Section 106 .. including breaches of contract, ...
breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade
practices such as passing off and false representation.
See Diamond, Preemption and State Law, app. B-1 in R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS
(1981).
103. Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before Subcom-
mittee No. 3 of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1389 (1965).
See generally S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., (1974); see also Comment, Misap-
propriation Doctrine After the Copyright Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L. REv. 469, 483
n.107; Diamond, supra note 102.
104. Goldstein, Federal Systems Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COL. L.
REV. 49 (1969); see LEGAL TIMEs WASH., March 25, 1981, at 25, col. 3. Sidney A.
Diamond, former Patent Office Commissioner, has suggested that "the public would
be better served if the last previous version of § 301(b)(3) could be restored to the
statute, giving us the benefit of the list of examples and permitting us to use the
extensive comments in the Senate and House Committee Reports as guidelines for
interpretation." See Diamond, supra note 102.
105. But see generally H.R. REP. No. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
106. Mitchell, Misappropriation and the New Copyright Act; An Overview, 10
GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 587, 604 (1980); Comment, Misappropriation Doctrine After
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L. REV. 469 (1977); Schuchart & Assocs.
Professional Engineers, Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 942 (W.D. Tex.
1982).
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be employed.
The first condition of section 301 is that the work must
be fixed in a tangible means of expression and come within
the proper subject matter of copyright. 10 7 These requirements
have already been discussed'0 8 and are present in the case of
computer programs.
The second condition of section 301 provides that the
rights asserted must be equivalent to those contained in sec-
tion 106. Section 106 provides the author with the right to
"reproduce . . . , prepare derivative copies ... , and distribute
copies ... by sale ... ,lease or lending."'' 09 If the challenged
state right restrains copying, distributing, or selling, it would
clearly be preempted by federal copyright protection. How-
ever, statutes which supplement the economic incentive to
create original works, such as resale royalty"0 statutes, pre-
sent a more difficult question.
When trade secret or other state rights are used to at-
tempt to restrain the reproduction of a copyrighted work,'
federal law would clearly preempt such application. However,
the doctrine of trade secrets is also based on rights subtly dif-
ferent from those grantk.d by the 1976 Act and a meritorious
argument against preemption can be made.
C. Distinguishing Between Trade Secret and Copyright
Trade secrets mainly originate by an express or implied
contract. A trade secret agreement does not confer any exclu-
sive rights, it only creates an interpersonal right between the
parties. 1 2 This is different from copyright protection which
originates by statute and is, theoretically, valid against the
world." 8
In addition, the trade secret tort is different from the re-
straint on copying outlined in the Act because it is premised
on a breach of trust or confidentiality, whereas copyright does
107. Mitchell supra note 106, at 604; Comment supra note 106, at 490.
108. See supra notes 21-56 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 101.
110. See Katz, supra note 81.
111. Under the 1976 Act copyright affixes upon creation. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a)
(1976).
112. R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 7.08-2F (1981).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
[Vol. 231052
TRADE SECRET
not require any form of special relationship. 1 4 Support for
this distinction can be found in the legislative history of sec-
tion 301 which provides:
The evolving common law rights of "privacy," "public-
ity," and trade secrets, and the general laws of defama-
tion and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the
causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of
personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that
are different in kind from copyright infringement. Noth-
ing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to con-
tract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract;
however, to the extent that the unfair competition con-
cept known as "interference with contractual relations" is
merely the equivalent of copyright protection, it would be
preempted.11'
There is also a basic difference in the subject matter that
each system protects. Trade secret law is intended to hold the
very idea inviolate, while copyright law only extends to the
expression of the idea.116 While each system is based on differ-
ent principles, they do compliment and overlap one another.
It is this overlap that is the basis for dispute.
The remedies afforded by state and federal law differ as
well. Trade secrecy provides injunctive relief to prohibit dis-
closure and damages for breach of contract.1 17 Copyright al-
lows for statutory damages, attorneys fees, and actual dam-
ages.1 ' The problem arises again when state law seeks
damages for copying, reproducing, or distributing matter that
is copyrighted.11
1. Case Precedent
Of the cases that have arisen under section 301 of the
1976 Act, many have held state law preempted. In Mitchell v.
114. Management Science America, Inc., v. Cyborg Systems, 6 COMPUTER L.
SERV. REP. 921 (N.D. IM. 1978).
115. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5748.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1976). See also Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 715, 731; 299
P.2d 257, 265 (1956): Technicon Medical Information Systems v. Green Bay Packag-
ing, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032, 1038 (7th Cir. 1982).
117. Johnson, Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1004
(1978).
118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504, 505 (1977).
119. For example, the author may seek to restrain the infringer from copying
and distributing based on a state law claim.
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Penton/Industrial Publishing Co.,1 0 the plaintiff alleged that
Penton willfully misappropriated parts of his book and in-
fringed the copyright. The court dismissed the pendent state
claim of misappropriation as being preempted under section
301 because it did not assert any violations other than unlaw-
ful copying. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
terprises1 21 and Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 22 claims of cop-
yright infringement were filed along with dependent state
claims for the unauthorized reproduction of the respective
plaintiff's protected writings. In dismissing the state causes
the courts held that the rights asserted were no different from
those found in section 106, and that state law may not govern
the preparation and distribution of copyrighted works. 23
Another line of recent cases has held for preemption, but
suggested that trade secret and copyright may co-exist when
based on different rights. In Avco Corp. v. Precision Air
Parts, Inc.,12 4 plaintiff claimed that a competitor, Precision,
had copied its drawings and prepared derivative works from
them. The court found that the material was within the sub-
ject matter of copyright but held the claim of common law
copyright infringement barred by the Alabama one-year stat-
ute of limitations. 12 5 In addressing plaintiff's second claim of
misappropriation of trade secrets, the court found the cause of
action to be based on the act of copying.' 21 The court held
that since there was no breach of trust or confidentiality the
claim of damages based on copying was an attempt to exercise
a right equivalent to those granted in section 106 and conse-
quently the claims were preempted. 127 The court went on to
suggest that this result might have been circumvented had
Avco demonstrated that Precision violated any of the common
law rights of trade secret based on an "invasion of personal
rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality. ' ' 21
120. 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
121. 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
122. 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980).
123. 501 F. Supp. 848, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 503 F. Supp. 146, 149, (D.D.C.
1980).
124. 210 U.S.P.Q. 894 (M.D.Ala. 1980), aff'd., 676 F.2d 494 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 450 (1983).
125. 210 U.S.P.Q. at 897.
126. Id. at 898.
127. Id.
128. Id. "[Pilaintiff has not even alleged, much less shown, that defendant has
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Another relevant case, Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing, Co."'9 dealt with the copying of com-
puter formats. Although the court found that University had
willfully engaged in copyright infringement, it held the unfair
competition claim to be preempted because the relief sought
was identical to that granted by the 1976 Act.130 Here again,
in the absence of a breach of trust or confidentiality, there
was nothing to set the state law claim apart from a pure re-
straint on copying.13 1 As in Avco, the court suggested that a
breach of trust or confidentiality would have changed the out-
come.18 2 These cases suggest that it is possible to sue under
state trade secret law so long as the relief sought is particular
to trade secret or based on a special relationship. " '
2. Recent Computer Cases That Have Distinguished
State and Federal Rights
The computer cases that have arisen under section 301
support the proposition that state trade secret law is not pre-
empted by federal copyright law. In Management Science
America v. Cyborg Systems"" the plaintiff claimed a wrongful
appropriation of computer software trade secrets by its former
employees. After holding against the defendant, Cyborg, on
the issue of trade secret disclosure by notice of copyright,135
the court stated in dictum that "the states remain free to en-
force claims which include additional elements such as breach
of trust of confidentiality. '"I 6 This position was supported in
Technicon Medical Information Systems Corp. v. Green Bay
Packaging, Inc.13 7 Technicon involved a case in which a past
client had utilized the plaintiff's software and distributed it as
its own in violation of the trade secret non-disclosure agree-
ment and copyright law. The court reinforced the position ad-
committed any of the elements that allow the common law rights of trade secret to
avoid preemption." Id. Some of the elements are: violation of a confidential relation-
ship, subterfuge, or conversion. See supra note 115.
129. 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
130. Id. at 44.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. This may occur when the defendant has disclosed or disseminated the
work in violation of the non-disclosure trade secret agreement.
134. 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (CALLAGHAN) 921 (1978).
135. Id. at 924-25.
136. Id. at 926 n.4.
137. 211 U.S.P.Q. 343 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982).
1983] 1055
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
vanced in Management Science when it held that present or
potential federal protection did not operate as a waiver of all
rights under state trade secret law.188 Finally, in Warrington
Assocs. v. Real-time Engineering Systems, Inc.5 9 the plaintiff
alleged that defendant, Real-time, misappropriated its trade
secrets, violated its copyrights, and engaged in unfair compe-
tition.1 40 The court analyzed section 301 and held the state
rights to be non-equivalent because the nature of trade secret
law is to protect the idea, whereas the intent of copyright law
is to protect the expression of the idea.14 1 In reviewing Minne-
sota and Wisconsin law the court held that the trade secret
cause of action was not preempted because "the common law
of each of these forums stresses that the trade secrets tort is
premised on concepts of breach of trust and confidentiality,
not copying."1 42
The computer cases not only held that state trade secret
law was not preempted by federal copyright law, 14 but they
went one step further and sanctioned their simultaneous use
as a viable means of protection for computer programs in cer-
tain situations.
D. Simultaneous Use of Trade Secrecy and Copyright: A
Conflict with the Policies of Section 301?
Upon careful review, it is evident that the purposes un-
derlying section 301 are consistent with the simultaneous use
of trade secrecy and copyright. The three major policies un-
derlying section 301 are as follows: 1) promotion of national
uniformity; 2) implementation of the limited times provision
of the Constitution; and 3) reduction of the legal significance
of "publication."1 44
138. 211 U.S.P.Q. at 347.
139. 522 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ill. 1981).
140. Id. at 367-68.
141. Id. at 368; see Bryce v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 319 N.W.2d 907 (1982),
rev. denied.
142. 522 F. Supp. at 369.
143. See R. MILORIM, TRADE SECRETS (1981); ABA Section of Patent, Trade-
mark, and Copyright Law, 1981 Committee Reports Proposed Resolutions 206-1, 309-
1, 91, 159 (1981) (recommendations presented at annual meeting). The ABA section
recommended that 17 U.S.C. § 301 be amended to specifically exclude trade secrets
from preemption; see also H.R. REP. No. 6983, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
144. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5746. A fourth and final purpose is
to improve international dealings by the use of a single system.
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1. Promotion of National Uniformity
Although trade secret law injects state law into the pro-
tection scheme, the 1976 Act was mainly designed to eliminate
common law copyright " 5 and those rights equivalent to copy-
right. Because trade secrecy rights are not equivalent, the fact
that they vary from state to state is immaterial.
The legislative history of section 3014 6 indicates that the
single copyright system is designed to avoid the practical diffi-
culties of litigating authors' rights under different laws and
state courts. However, because common law copyright is elim-
inated, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any
and all copyright claims. The copyright cause of action would
be tried under this single federal system and the trade secret
claim would merely become an ancillary issue; thus the laws
governing each claim would not interfere, but would remain
separate.
2. Reduction of the Legal Significance of Publication
The legislative history of section 301 also reveals147 that
the concept of publication was the most important factor in
the 1909 Act and its largest defect."" Historically, publication
was made by distribution of printed copies and provided an
understandable dividing line between common law and statu-
tory protection. 4 Today, with the emergence of new techno-
logical uses of copyrighted works, such as computer programs,
video-recordings, and electronic music,150 the legal definition
has become artificial and obscure."' The 1976 Act eliminated
any significance of publication because the concept had lost
much of its original meaning.152
Prior to 1976, it was necessary to publish and therefore
disclose the work to obtain statutory copyright protection.
With the elimination of common law copyright, a question
may arise as to whether it is necessary to disclose the work to
145. Id. at 5745.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5664.
151. Id. at 5745; see also 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 351, 356 (1977); 69
COLUM L. REv. 49, 53 n.31(1969).
152. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26 at 5745.
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receive statutory protection-the only remaining form of cop-
yright. However, the elimination of common law copyright
does not mean that disclosure is necessarily required. Statu-
tory copyright now affixes at the time of creation without any
affirmative act of disclosure." 8 As a result, secrecy may be
maintained even if certain registration requirements are met.
3. Implementation of the Limited Times Provision of
the United States Constitution
The Constitution5 provides authors with exclusive rights
to their writings for a limited time only. This policy under the
1909 Act was distorted by state common law copyright which
afforded the possibility for perpetual existence.15 With the
elimination of common law copyright, the protection is re-
stricted to a limited time. 156 Because state trade secret law
also has the potential for perpetual life, it can be argued that
this violates the intent behind the limited times provision of
the Constitution.
However, the additional use of trade secrecy is not neces-
sarily unconstitutional. Trade secret protection is not abso-
lute. It may be lost at any time through reverse engineering or
independent discovery by a competitor who may make use of
the expression or idea.157 Though trade secrets may be perpet-
ual, their use by a competitor is not foreclosed as they are in
patent or copyright law. Because trade secrecy and copyright
are separate in nature in what they protect and how they pro-
tect it, the use of one form does not necessarily effect and ex-
tend the protections of the other. 5 ' Thus, an author can util-
ize either form independently or use them similtaneously
without conflict.
E. Criticism by the American Bar Association
The ABA Section on Patent, Trademark, and Copyright
153. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1976).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. S.
155. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5746.
156. The time span of a copyright is the life of the author plus fifty years. 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
157. See BROOKS, supra note 5; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974).
158. Frijouf, Simultaneous Copyright and Patent Protection, 23 COPYRIGHT L.
Symp. 99, 112 (1977).
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Law recently recommended that the simultaneous use of trade
secret and copyright be rejected.189 The reasons advanced
were threefold: 1) that under Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., an election had to be made between conflicting modes
of protection; 2) that dual use interferes with the operation of
the copyright notice; and 3) that simultaneous use would cre-
ate a "super-copyright."' 1 0 As will be established below, these
criticisms misperceive the nature of copyright.
1. Election Under Kewanee
The ABA recommendation asserts that under Kewanee' 61
a choice must be made between conflicting modes of protec-
tion (i.e. patent and trade secret). 62 However, Kewanee sug-
gested that this choice must be made between patent and
trade secret protection because they are mutually exclusive.
Patent protection requires total disclosure, which would de-
stroy any secrets, whereas copyright protection does not re-
quire disclosure as a prerequisite because it affixes at the time
of creation.16 Even when registration is made as a prerequi-
site to a suit for infringement, the trade secret may still be
shielded by the special deposit procedure."' As a result, any
reliance on Kewanee to suggest that the election must be
made between trade secret and copyright is misplaced because
where copyrights will not shield the underlying idea, patents
will.
The protection afforded by a patent can be much greater
than that of copyright.'" Patent protection extends to the un-
derlying idea while copyright merely covers the surface ex-
pression. Because of this potential for greater protection, the
requirements for obtaining a patent are stricter than those for
copyright. An invention must be novel, nonobvious, and be in-
159. A.B.A. SECTION OP PAT., TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, COMM. REP. §§
206-1, 309-1 (proposed resolutions at 91-93, 59-61)(1981). The A.B.A. section ap-
proved resolution 206-1 after the words "and unfair competition" were eliminated.
Section 309-1 was recommitted for further consideration. A.B.A. SECTION OF PAT.,
TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, COMM. REP., (Summary of Proceedings at 60-61,
36)(1981).
160. See A.B.A. COMM. REP., supra note 159, at 91.
161. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
162. See A.B.A. COMM. REP., supra note 159, at 92.
163. 17 U.S.C. §408(a) (1976).
164. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
165. See generally Frijouf, supra note 158, at 104.
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cluded within the proper subject matter for patent cover-
age, 168 while copyright protection affixes at the time of crea-
tion to those works within its subject matter.167 In addition,
before a valid patent may issue, the underlying idea must be
completely disclosed and dedicated to the public. 68 Copyright
does not have a strict disclosure policy; the owner may obtain
protection while retaining the expression of his work. 69 In
short, the analogy between patent and copyright law is inap-
posite especially concerning the disclosure of the idea.
2. Undue Interference with Copyright Notice
Section 401 of the 1976 Act provides for placement of no-
tice on all publicly distributed copies of the protected work. 170
Two of the primary purposes of this notice are to show that a
copyright claim was made and to show the date of its publica-
tion.'7 ' It may be argued that a person who relies on this pro-
vision may be misled into thinking that the work has been
disclosed and inadvertently breach the disclosure restriction
placed on the program. This restriction would unduly impair
the effective purpose of the notice requirement if it led some-
one to believe he was complying with the law when, in fact, he
was not.
However, the copyright notice that is attached merely in-
forms the reader that the owner has a proprietary interest in
the specific material, not that it is actually disclosed."" This
notice, coupled with a statement of restriction on use, may be
employed to inform the reader that no disclosure has been ef-
fected and that the program still remains secret. 17  Further-
more, in most circumstances the only people who should have
access to the work are those persons who already know of its
166. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1976).
167. 17 U.S.C. §3 102, 408(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
168. Berry v. Glidden Co., 92 F. Supp. 909, 913 (1950).
169. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
171. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5759; see also 17 U.S.C. § 405(b)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d. 397 (2d
Cir. 1970).
172. Technicon Medical Information Syss. Inc. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc.,
687 F.2d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 1982). However, to circumvent this problem an author
may place a special legend on the work, such as, "unpublished, all rights reserved
under the copyright laws." See A.B.A. COMM. REP., supra note 159, at 93.
173. See D. BROOKS, supra note 5. Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Con-
trols, Inc., 357 A.2d. 105, 113 (Del. 1975).
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secret status and are contractually bound to silence because of
the restriction provisions in the license. Therefore, the only
people who are permitted to come in contact with the pro-
gram are already on notice of its limited scope of use. This
negates the assertion that dual employment of trade secret
and copyright impairs the notice provision by subjecting inno-
cent persons to conflicting theories of use.
3. Super Copyright
The ABA further criticizes the dual use of trade secret
and copyright for computer programs in that it withholds
rights that constitutionally should be relinquished.17' The
ABA position is that copyright protection is awarded in ex-
change for the author's public disclosure of not only the ex-
pression, but of the ideas embodied in the expression. 7 5 This
requirement, it is argued, furthers the policy of allowing the
public the opportunity to make open and free use of the
materials. However, copyright does not necessarily require
disclosure in exchange for protection. The argument is again
based on the analogy between patent and copyright and, as
previously noted, is inappropriate.
Different interests are involved in copyright. 76 Copyright
protection comes about immediately at the time of creation.1 7
In contrast the patent owner's rights arise as a result of his
disclosure of the invention. The author not only has a pecuni-
ary interest, but also has a personal interest, in the disposition
of his work. 7 8 According to English common law, the author
had a right to restrain others from publishing even his unpub-
174. A.B.A. SECTION OF PAT. TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, COMM. REP. §
206-1, (proposed resolution at 92)(1981).
175. Id.
176.
Basic copyright law presupposes that the author make his own works
available to the public in exchange for protection for a limited time ....
This basic assumption loses much of its validity when applied to unpub-
lished works, for even though unpublished works are not available to the
public they are afforded basic copyright protection.
Comment, Copyright and Privacy, Protection of Unpublished Works, 13 COLUM. J.L.
AND Soc. PRORs. 351, 364, n.95 (1977).
177. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
178. Some examples of works in which the author's personal right is more pro-
nounced are diaries, private letters, lectures, and speeches. Comment, The 1976 Cop-
yright Act and Preemption of Private Letters, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 205 (1979); H.
BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 29-30 (2d ed. 1944).
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lished works. 17 9 This right was inherent in the creation of the
work, as opposed to the more familiar restraint on copying
granted by statute.180 The author maintains this right so long
as the computer program remains unpublished, even though
there is a contractually restricted communication to a third
party. Since this right is given to the author by copyright, it is
within his power to retain it as he chooses.
Evidence of this right appears in the pre-1976 existence
of common law copyright and the provision of the 1976 Act
that affixes protection at the time of creation, not publica-
tion. 81 Another factor lending support to this argument is the
permissive deposit policy of such other things as secure
tests'82 and unpublished movies.1 85 This demonstrates that it
is not necessary to disclose the work to obtain protection, and
that some procedures are created to provide a mechanism to
ensure that the author disposes of his work in his own fashion.
Although such a withholding concept may strain the pol-
icy of copyright disclosure, it is necessary because of the vul-
nerability of a computer program to piracy. The non-disclos-
ure of software, coupled with copyright protection, is not
simply a technical possibility; it is a right that the author has
to exercise as he wishes.
V. CONCLUSION
Several problems arise with respect to the use of both
state trade secret law and federal copyright law. Although re-
cent cases have favored dual use, they may be criticized as
limited in import because they are not final or controlling.184
179. See H. BALL, supra note 179, at 26.
180. Id.
181. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(b)(4) (1982), "[A] secure test is a non-marketed test
administered under supervision at specific centers on specific dates, all copies of
which are accounted for and either destroyed or returned to restricted, locked storage
following each administration." d. The propriety of secure test permissive deposit
was held valid in National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies,
495 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. I1. 1980); Association of American Medical Colleges v. Carey,
482 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
182. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1976) & Supp. IV 1980).
183. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(b)(2)(vi)(1982).
184. Approval of simultaneous use was given by implication in Avco Corp. v.
Precision Air Parts, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 894 (N.D. Ala. 1980) and Synercom Technol-
ogy, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979), by dicta in
Management Service America, Inc. v. Cyborg Systems, 6 COMP. L. SERv. REr. (Calla-
ghan) 921 (1918) and Technicon Medical Information Systems v. Green Bay Packag-
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However, the use of state trade secret law does not seem to
conflict with federal copyright law, and an analysis of section
301 indicates that the policies of the preemption provision do
not present any further obstacles.
Another opposition to simultaneous use is aimed at dis-
closure. It is hoped that it will "reduce the number of occa-
sions ... a programmer has to repeat the prior effort of an-
other because that prior effort is kept secret." '185 However, any
forced disclosures will only reveal the work to the competition
and allow them to make use of the underlying idea without
paying for the development costs. This result strips the au-
thor of his personal and proprietary right in the product, and
discourages investment in technological advances.
There would be no abatement of progress if the competi-
tion had to purchase what technology they gleaned from the
subject program. If a competitor is able to circumvent the
copyright, the result will be the disappearance of the incentive
to develop computer programs, not greater accessibility to the
public.186
Computer programs are not the same as literary works
and do not fit neatly within the standard copyright protection.
While literary works are generally unique and are valued for
their expression, computer programs offer more utilitarian
benefits, and it is just as worthwhile to pirate the underlying
idea as its expression. Dual use is necessitated because of the
failure of all other forms of protection. The need for a more
neatly tailored form of protection has plagued the computer
industry for too long. The simultaneous use of copyright and
trade secret law offers hope of filling that need.
Philip McGarrigle
ing, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q., 343 (E.D. Wis. 1980) and summary judgement in Warrington
Assocs. v. Real-Time Engineering Systems, 522 F.Supp. 367 (N.D. Wis. 1981).
185. Report of the Software Subcommittee to the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETs app. B-3 at
B3-17(1981).
186. See Katz, supra note 81, at 492.
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